How will the Court decide Hobby Lobby?
Apr 28, 2014, Vol. 19, No. 31 • By ADAM J. WHITE
But while the nondelegation doctrine only rarely causes a court to strike down a statute completely, the doctrine can play a substantial role in how the courts interpret statutes. As Sunstein wrote in his influential article,
In short, the nondelegation doctrine offers a fundamental principle to guide courts in the work of interpreting statutes. Congress often writes statutes in very broad terms, leaving substantial room for willful agencies to make major policy decisions. Delegating too much discretion to an agency would undermine the Framers’ basic vision, stated best by Madison in Federalist 51, that legislative and executive power must be kept separate, so that the national government “will be controlled by itself.” Thus, when a court is called upon to review an agency’s implementation of a statute, the nondelegation doctrine reminds that it may be necessary for the court to construe the statute somewhat more narrowly, to vindicate the Constitution’s separation of powers.
But the nondelegation doctrine differs slightly from more common separation-of-powers questions. Usually, the separation of powers is intended to guard against the risk that one branch will encroach upon the powers of the other. But sometimes the problem is not that a branch wants too much power, but too little—that is, the branch wants to avoid responsibility for its own actions. Thus, the nondelegation doctrine ensures Congress’s accountability, by preventing Congress from blithely handing to agencies the power to make important policy choices that ought to be decided by Congress in the first instance.
In the federal courts, that point has been made eloquently by . . . Justice Kennedy, in a series of opinions that have attracted nowhere near the attention that his federalism opinions attracted. Indeed, he made this point long before his appointment to the Supreme Court. In 1981, when he was still a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Kennedy heard the case of Chadha v. INS, challenging the constitutionality of a federal law empowering each house of Congress to veto decisions by the Immigration and Naturalization Service not to deport aliens. Kennedy and two other judges unanimously ruled that the “one-house veto” violated the Constitution’s separation of powers. (The Supreme Court later affirmed their ruling, in a seminal separation-of-powers decision.)
Kennedy’s opinion for the Ninth Circuit focused primarily on the dangers of Congress encroaching upon the president’s exclusive power to execute the laws, but he also examined the issue from the other direction, in terms of delegation and responsibility:
As Kennedy explained, the separation of powers among the branches and the nondelegation doctrine ultimately serve two distinct interests: the “twin purposes” of “promoting governmental efficiency” and “preventing concentrations of power dangerous to liberty.”
Once elevated to the Supreme Court, Kennedy has returned time and time again to the role of the Constitution’s separation of powers as a structural protection for liberty, just as he returned to the relationship between federalism and liberty. In Public Citizen v. Department of Justice (1989), a case asking whether Congress could pass statutes affecting the president’s power to nominate judges, Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion opened with a strong defense of the separation of powers in service of liberty, quoting first Charles Pinckney and then Madison’s Federalist Papers:
Justice Kennedy struck similar notes in his concurring opinion in the line item veto case, Clinton v. City of New York (1998) (“Liberty is always at stake when one or more of the branches seek to transgress the separation of powers”), and in his opinion for the Court in one of the Guantánamo detention cases, Boumediene v. Bush (2008) (“The Framers’ inherent distrust of governmental power was the driving force behind the constitutional plan that allocated powers among three independent branches. This design serves not only to make Government accountable but also to secure individual liberty”).
But on questions of Congress delegating power to agencies, Kennedy’s focus on liberty is most clearly pronounced in his opinion for the Court in Gonzales v. Oregon (2006). There the government argued that because the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) empowers the attorney general to regulate or prohibit the distribution of drugs, the attorney general could prohibit the distribution of drugs for physician-assisted suicide. But Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court majority, rejected the suggestion that the CSA’s grant of general regulatory power to the attorney general could be construed as empowering him to decide unilaterally the contentious issue of assisted suicide. The “idea that Congress gave the Attorney General such a broad and unusual authority through an implicit delegation,” Kennedy wrote for the Court, “is not sustainable.” Quoting key precedents on these themes, Kennedy stressed that Congress “does not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions—it does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes.” The Court will not casually affirm an agency’s constitutionally controversial assertions of regulatory power, precisely because the Court is “confident that Congress could not have intended to delegate a decision of such economic and political significance to an agency in so cryptic a fashion.”
When the issue of physician-assisted suicide had been “the subject of an ‘earnest and profound debate’ across the country,” it strained the Court’s credulity to suggest that Congress truly did (or could) simply hand the issue off for unilateral decision by the attorney general:
Thus, Justice Kennedy and the Court struck down the attorney general’s implementation of the act; if Congress truly wanted to empower the executive branch to decide the assisted-suicide question, then Congress would have to amend the statute and clearly command that policy.
As one might now suspect, this could be the point that Kennedy was pressing in the Hobby Lobby arguments. Abortion, including methods of contraception that induce early abortion, is among the most contentious political issues of our time—far more controversial than assisted suicide was when Gonzales v. Oregon came before the Court. Kennedy knows this better than anyone: He cowrote the opinion that reaffirmed Roe v. Wade’s basic right to abortion in its moment of greatest peril, and he wrote the opinion affirming Congress’s power to prohibit partial-birth abortion. He and his colleagues are well aware of the “earnest and profound debate” surrounding the abortion issue; he’s looked down upon the plaza before the courthouse and seen the protesters. And now he and his colleagues have been asked by the government to affirm that a single cabinet secretary can unilaterally decide that religious persons must pay for other people’s contraceptives and abortifacients, or incur a tax for their refusal to pay, based on one modestly worded statute.
Perhaps Justice Kennedy’s intended audience at oral argument was not so much the lawyers, or even the agency, but Congress and the general public: If this nation is going to erect a new program for funding people’s access to abortifacients and contraceptives, a policy fraught with fundamental questions about religious liberty, then Congress must pass statutes more specific than merely providing for “minimum essential coverage.” Perhaps Justice Kennedy means to say, as he quoted in Gonzales, that “Congress could not have intended to delegate a decision of such economic and political significance to an agency in so cryptic a fashion”—all the more so when Congress also has passed a statute, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, requiring the government to minimize burdens on religious liberty, not needlessly exacerbate them.
Whether or not this is what Justice Kennedy had in mind during the Hobby Lobby arguments—and he surely will make clear his position soon enough—we can expect the modern administrative state to raise many more questions of constitutional principle in the future. The establishment of the administrative state, in both the Progressive Era and the New Deal, raised challenging questions about constitutional structure and rights. We seem to find ourselves in a similar moment once again. The administrative state’s vigorous growth, in both scope and intensity, has returned it to the center of constitutional debate.
So far, this has been seen most clearly in matters of federalism, as law professor Gillian Metzger noted in a 2008 article. In an era when the Supreme Court was largely unwilling “to impose significant constitutional limits on the substantive scope of Congress’s regulatory powers,” the same Court took steps to ensure “that the impact of challenged agency decisions on the states is considered.” Perhaps Metzger’s diagnosis of the Court’s unwillingness to impose limits was too pessimistic, especially as seen in the Court’s willingness to overturn the Affordable Care Act’s encroachment upon state authority in the Medicaid expansion (by a 7-2 supermajority of the justices, no less). But Metzger and others are certainly on to something when they suggest that “administrative law may be becoming the home of a new federalism.”
So, too, with the separation of powers. The Court has proven its willingness to strike down altogether statutory structures that violate the separation of powers, such as the Sarbanes-Oxley accounting reform law’s attempt to create an “independent agency” within yet another “independent agency,” which the Court struck down in 2010. And perhaps the Court will do something similar in NLRB v. Noel Canning, the challenge to President Obama’s appointment of officers without Senate confirmation, now pending before the Court. But looking beyond such singular cases, the courts can also vindicate constitutional design simply in the way that they interpret statutes and review agencies’ implementation of federal statutes—statutes such as the Affordable Care Act.
“What kind of constitutional structure do we have if the Congress can give an agency the power to grant or not grant a religious exemption based on what the agency determined?” Justice Kennedy asked the question; it falls now to him and his colleagues to answer it.
Adam J. White is a lawyer in Washington, D.C.
NOTE: The original version of this article quoted Justice Kennedy, at oral argument, as saying that "I recognize delegation of powers rules are somewhat more abundant insofar as their enforcement in this Court." But as SCOTUSblog's Lyle Deniston notes by email, and law professor Josh Blackman explains in detail, the Court subsequently modified its transcript to read, "I recognize delegation of powers rules are somewhat moribund insofar as their enforcement in this Court."
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